The Inaction of Herman Melville’s Bartleby: Moral Silence or Passive Escape?
Melville’s work Bartleby, the Scrivener has earned a unique place in the history of literature and philosophy with its unique form of resistance against the existential loneliness of the modern individual, social norms and mechanisms of obedience. Bartleby’s statement “I prefer not to do it” is not merely an avoidance of a task, but a systemic refusal on a much broader level. In this context, the following question arises: Can this radical inaction be a moral attitude?
- Immanuel Kant – The Ethics of Duty
Kant finds the basis of morality in the sense of “duty”. According to him, an action is moral only when it is done with good intentions and within the framework of a universalizable law:
“Only good intentions have moral value.” (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)
Bartleby does not assume any duties and rejects social responsibilities. From the Kantian ethics perspective, his inaction is not moral, because it does not arise from a sense of duty, but from an indifference that has lost touch with the world.
- Friedrich Nietzsche – The Genealogy of Morality
Nietzsche, especially in his critique of slave morality, questions the value judgments of society that make the individual passive and inactive:
“Morality is a system invented by the weak to suppress the strong.” (Genealogie der Moral)
Bartleby’s inaction may be a nihilism deprived of power. According to Nietzsche, such an attitude is far from affirming life and is a passive exhaustion; therefore, from his perspective, Bartleby’s behavior is an example of decadence rather than morality.
- Emmanuel Levinas – Confronting the Other
According to Levinas, ethics is born in encountering the face of the other:
“The face of the other tells me, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’” (Totalité et Infini)
Bartleby does not look at his boss’s face, he breaks off the social relationship. Although this situation may seem like a problem in terms of Levinasian ethics, its absolute fragility and silent existence can also be read as a kind of moral call: its existence itself creates a responsibility.
- Albert Camus – Absurd and Rebellion
Camus’ absurd philosophy advocates man’s rebellion against the meaninglessness of life:
“Man’s duty is to rebel against the absurdity of life.” (Le Mythe de Sisyphe)
In this sense, Bartleby is in a state of rebellion against the system and the production of meaning. According to Camus, this attitude of his can be a kind of “absurd rebellion.” Inaction here becomes a moral attitude against the absurdity of the order.
- Hannah Arendt – Inaction and the Banality of Evil
Arendt draws attention to the danger of inaction, especially in totalitarian regimes. In the case of Eichmann, he sees “unthinking obedience” as the ordinary source of evil:
“Evil often arises not from great things, but from thoughtless mediocrity.” (Eichmann in Jerusalem)
Bartleby, on the other hand, is not thoughtless, but radically inactive. This is not considered a moral attitude in Arendt’s framework; however, since he consciously “chooses not to do” instead of thoughtless action, his form of “passive disobedience” can be considered a form of moral awareness.
- Giorgio Agamben – The Potential of Not-Doing
Agamben sees Bartleby’s formula as the fundamental expression of the modern understanding of freedom:
“Bartleby realizes his power to do by not doing.” (Bartleby, or On Contingency)
According to this perspective, Bartleby’s inaction is not passivity, but the choice of the alternative, that is, the freedom not to do. This is a kind of ethical action, because being able to freely say “no” in a world of necessity is one of the radical forms of morality.
- Søren Kierkegaard – Silent Despair
According to Kierkegaard, despair is the loss of one’s connection with God and one’s own essence:
“Despair is the disease of not being oneself.” (Sygdommen til Døden)
In this sense, Bartleby is in existential despair. He is not in harmony with his own self and is alienated from the world. From Kierkegaard’s perspective, this situation is not a moral but a spiritual crisis.
- Slavoj Žižek – Radical Passivity
Žižek interprets Bartleby as the model of modern resistance:
“Bartleby’s formula is a radical rejection of the desire imposed by the neoliberal system.” (The Parallax View)
For him, Bartleby’s “choosing not to do” is a radical ethical position: a silent revolution that exposes and undermines the internal logic of the system. For Žižek, this kind of inaction is a moral intervention.
- Theodor W. Adorno – Negative Dialectics and Silence
According to Adorno, meaning in modern society has been lost along with cultural decay. The true ethical attitude is to “not participate” in this decay:
“Real life begins with refusing to be part of the wrong order.” (Minima Moralia)
Bartleby’s inaction is perfectly consistent with Adorno’s ethics of “not participating.” His “choosing not to do” is not so much doing something as choosing not to integrate into the system – which may be a form of high ethical awareness for Adorno.
- Michel Foucault – Forms of Resistance and Micropowers
According to Foucault, power operates not only through oppression, but in every area of daily life. Resistance is also possible at this micro level:
“In every power relationship, there is also a point of resistance.” (La volonté de savoir)
Bartleby’s “inaction” is not like classical forms of resistance; but it is powerful for this very reason. Within Foucault’s framework, Bartleby’s state of not choosing can be read as an ethical gesture that stops the functioning of power.
