Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus’s 1837 work distorts Hegel’s dialectic by reducing it to a thesis-antithesis-synthesis scheme.

This article examines how Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus’s presentation of Hegelian dialectics as a “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” scheme in his 1837 work, *Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel* , distorts the specific logic of Hegelian philosophy. The study demonstrates that this tripartite scheme is not a methodological principle in Hegel’s fundamental texts; instead, it argues that Hegelian dialectics is a dynamic process operating on the basis of immanent negation, Aufhebung (self-unfolding), and the self-revelation of the concept. The article’s central argument is that Chalybaus’s interpretation, beyond a didactic simplification, reduces Hegelian dialectics to a mechanical and external model of opposition.

1. Introduction

Hegel’s philosophy occupies a central position in the history of modern thought, both in terms of its influence and its misunderstandings. The most common of these misunderstandings is the formulation of Hegelian dialectics as “thesis-antithesis-synthesis.” This triad, almost synonymous with Hegelian thought today, does not appear as a systematic method in Hegel’s own works. Nevertheless, this schema has become the standard way of explaining Hegel’s dialectical method, especially since the second half of the 19th century.

This article traces the historical origins of this misunderstanding to Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus’s 1837 work and aims to demonstrate how this reductionist interpretation distorts the logical structure of Hegelian dialectics.

2. Chalybaus’s 1837 Study and Interpretation Framework

Chalybaus’s work , Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel , is one of the early systematic studies aiming to present German idealism within a historical developmental trajectory. In this context, Chalybaus adopts a comparative and schematic narrative to demonstrate the intellectual continuity between Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

However, this schematic approach falls short of grasping the specificity of Hegel’s dialectic. Chalybaus, in explaining the Hegelian movement, presents the dialectical process as a threefold model of opposition and reconciliation: “thesis-antithesis-synthesis.” This presentation transforms Hegel’s dialectic, based on the immanent development of the concept, into an external and pedagogical form (Chalybaus, 1837).

3. Conceptual Foundations of Hegelian Dialectics

3.1. The Logical Nature of Dialectics

For Hegel, dialectics is not a method or an external schema, but the movement of the concept itself . In the Science of Logic , Hegel emphasizes that the progress of thought is determined not by external oppositions, but by the internal contradictions of the concept itself (Hegel, 1812–1816/2010).

In this context, dialectics:

• It is not based on predetermined poles such as thesis and antithesis.
• It progresses by transcending the concept’s own definitions.
• It conceives of negativity not as an external antagonist, but as an immanent moment.

3.2. Immanent Negativity (Immanente Negativität)

At the heart of Hegelian dialectics lies the concept of immanent negativity . A concept, to the extent that it carries its own determinations, also contains the limits of those determinations within itself. Therefore, negativity is not an “antithesis” coming from outside the concept, but rather its own internal tension (Hegel, 1830/1991).

This point fundamentally deviates from the thesis-antithesis-synthesis schema, because that schema assumes opposition to be an external and symmetrical structure.

3.3. The Concept of Aufhebung

One of the most critical concepts of Hegelian dialectics is Aufhebung . Aufhebung:

• Elimination
• Protection
• Exceeding a higher level

It contains both meanings simultaneously. This polysemous structure shows that the dialectical process is not a mechanical “compromise” but a qualitative transformation (Hegel, 1807/2018).

The thesis-antithesis-synthesis scheme reduces this complex structure of Aufhebung to a simple idea of ​​”synthesis.”

4. Philosophical Problems of the Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Scheme

Chalybaus’s proposed tripartite scheme distorts Hegelian dialectics in the following ways:

1. Externalization: This removes dialectics from being an internal movement of the concept.
2. Mechanization: Transforms the process into a formal and repeatable scheme.
3. Historical Illusion: Presents Hegel as a continuation of Fichtean dialectics.

Therefore, Jean Hyppolite describes the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula as “a pedagogical framework later imposed on Hegelian philosophy” (Hyppolite, 1955).

5. The Spread of Misinterpretation and Its Effects

Chalybaus’s interpretation has become widespread, particularly through post-Hegelian textbooks and popular philosophical narratives. In Anglo-Saxon literature, this schema has become almost the definition of Hegelian dialectics; thus, Hegel’s philosophy of logic has been reduced to a reductionist historical cliché (Taylor, 1975).

The irony of this is that Hegel’s dialectic is precisely a way of thinking developed in opposition to such fixed and external schemas.

In summary

This article demonstrates that Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus’s 1837 work conceptually distorts Hegelian dialectics by reducing it to a thesis-antithesis-synthesis scheme. Hegelian dialectics is not a mechanical tripartite formula; it is the self-transcendence of the concept through its inherent negation. Instead of making Hegelian philosophy more understandable, Chalybaus’s interpretation has rendered its specific logic invisible.

Source

• Chalybaus, H. M. (1837). Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel . Dresden.
• Hegel, G. W. F. (1807/2018). Phenomenology of Spirit . trans. A. Assisted. Istanbul: Idea.
• Hegel, GWF (1812–1816/2010). Science of Logic . Translated by A. Yardımlı. Istanbul: İdea.
• Hegel, GWF (1830/1991). Encyclopedia: Philosophical Sciences . trans. T. Altuğ. Istanbul: İdea.
• Hyppolite, J. (1955). Logique et existence . Paris: PUF.
• Taylor, C. (1975). Hegel . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.